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The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and
Transformed
Richard D. Friedman*
I. Introduction
For several centuries, prosecution witnesses in criminal cases have
given their testimony under oath, face to face with the accused, and
subject to cross-examination at trial. The Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the procedure,
providing that ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be confronted with the witness against him.’’ In
recent decades, however, judicial protection of the right has been
lax, because the U.S. Supreme Court has tolerated admission of outof-court statements against the accused, without cross-examination,
if the statements are deemed ‘‘reliable’’ or ‘‘trustworthy.’’ This year,
in Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court did a sharp aboutface, holding that a testimonial statement cannot be admitted against
an accused, no matter how reliable a court may deem it to be, unless
the accused has had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
witness who made the statement.
Crawford is not only a vindication of the rights of the accused but
a victory for fidelity to constitutional text and intent. And yet the
decision leaves many open questions, and all lawyers involved in
the criminal justice process will have to adjust to the new regime
that it creates.
The transformation achieved by Crawford is crystallized by considering the facts of the case itself.2 Michael Crawford, upset by a report
that Kenneth Lee had made advances on his wife Sylvia, went with
Sylvia to Lee’s apartment. A violent fight followed, during the course
*Portions of this article have been previously published in Criminal Justice, a journal
published by the American Bar Association, and in the International Journal of Evidence
& Proof.
1
124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
2
See id. at 1356–59 (reciting facts of the case).
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of which Crawford was cut badly on the hand and stabbed Lee in
the stomach, seriously injuring him. That night, Sylvia and Michael
Crawford both made tape-recorded statements to the police at the
station-house. The statements were similar in many respects, but
Sylvia’s tended to damage Michael’s contention of self-defense.
Michael eventually was tried on charges stemming from the incident.
Sylvia was unwilling to testify at trial against her husband, and was
deemed by all parties to be unavailable as a witness. Accordingly,
the prosecution offered Sylvia’s station-house statement.
The case therefore fits the mold of what I have called ‘‘stationhouse testimony’’—a statement by a witness of an alleged crime,
made knowingly and privately to investigating officers, with the
clear anticipation on the part of all that the statement may be used
as prosecution evidence at trial. A lay observer as well as a lawyer
may have a strong intuitive sense that such a statement ought not be
used to help convict an accused. And yet, until this year, prevailing
doctrine failed to give a sufficiently clear signal that this was so.
Sylvia’s statement was admitted into evidence over Michael’s objection, he was convicted, and the Washington Supreme Court eventually upheld the conviction, holding that the ‘‘interlock’’ of Sylvia’s
and Michael’s statements rendered Sylvia’s sufficiently trustworthy
for Confrontation Clause purposes.3
The U.S. Supreme Court then reviewed the case. What is notable
is not that the Court reversed Crawford’s conviction, nor even that
it did so unanimously. Rather, as I explain more fully below, what
makes Crawford a landmark is that the Court discarded the flabby
doctrine that it had used to apply the Confrontation Clause and
instead adopted an approach that better fits the meaning and intent
of the Clause.
Part II of this article explores the values underlying the Confrontation Clause and its historical background. Part III shows how the
principle driving the Clause became obscured by a hopelessly flawed
body of doctrine. Part IV lays out the elements of the testimonial
framework adopted by Crawford. Part V examines, the areas of criminal procedure left unchanged by Crawford, and the open questions
that future courts will have to settle in the wake of this watershed
decision.
3

Id. at 1358.
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II. Values, History, and Text
A cornerstone of the Anglo-American legal system has long been
that a witness may not testify against an accused unless the witness
confronts the accused with the testimony. The requirement that
prosecution testimony be given this way—rather than, say, in writing or behind closed doors, as have been the methods in some
systems—serves a range of purposes:
● Openness. Confrontation guarantees openness of procedure,
which among other benefits ensures that the witness’s testimony
is not the product of torture or of milder forms of coercion or
intimidation. This is particularly important given the contrast
to early Continental systems, in which coercion of witnesses
examined privately was very common.
● Adversarial Procedure. Confrontation provides a chance for the
defendant, personally or through counsel, to dispute and
explore the weaknesses in the witness’s testimony. In an earlier
day, that chance came in the form of a wide-open altercation in
court. Today it comes in the form of cross-examination, usually
through counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
endorsed John Henry Wigmore’s characterization of crossexamination as ‘‘beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth.’’4 Of course, as Wigmore recognized, cross-examination may sometimes lead the
trier of fact away from the truth rather than toward it. But the
constitutionally required ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’ standard of persuasion in a criminal case reflects the extreme disutility of a false conviction.5 The same consideration demands that
4
5 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, at 32 (James Chadbourn rev. 1974) (quoted
in part in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123 (1999) (plurality opinion)). See also White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990); Perry
v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 n.7 (1989); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 415
(1986); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348
n.4 (1981); Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980); cf. United States v. Salerno,
505 U.S. 317, 328 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘Even if one does not completely
agree with Wigmore’s assertion . . . one must admit that in the Anglo-American legal
system cross-examination is the principal means of undermining the credibility of a
witness whose testimony is false or inaccurate.’’).
5
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970).
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the accused be able to cross-examine adverse witnesses even if
sometimes that requirement prevents the conviction of a
guilty person.
Discouragement of Falsehood. Confrontation discourages falsehood as well as assists in its detection. The prospect of testifying
under oath, subject to cross-examination, in the presence of the
accused makes false accusation much more difficult than it
would be otherwise, or so at least is the well-settled belief.6
Demeanor as Evidence. If, as is usually the case, the confrontation
occurs at trial or (in modern times) in a videotaped proceeding,
the trier of fact has an opportunity to assess the demeanor of
the witness.7
Elimination of Intermediaries. Confrontation eliminates the need
for intermediaries, and along with it any doubt about what the
witness’s testimony is.
Symbolic Purposes. Beyond these instrumental purposes, confrontation of prosecution witnesses serves a ‘‘strong symbolic
purpose’’ that repeatedly has been recognized by the Supreme
Court.8 Even if confrontation had no impact on the quality of
the prosecution’s evidence, it would be important to protect
because, as the Court said in Coy v. Iowa9 and repeated in Maryland v. Craig,10 ‘‘there is something deep in human nature that
regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser

6

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019–20
(1988) (‘‘It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind
his back.’’’). See also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1490 (1999) (‘‘The witness whose credibility would
be destroyed by cross-examination will not be called at all or will try to pull the
sting of the cross-examiner by acknowledging on direct examination the facts that a
cross-examiner could be expected to harp on.’’). Of course, the same prospect may
deter the giving of truthful testimony. But, again, the tradeoff accords with the
fundamental value underlying the ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’ standard. See Craig,
497 U.S. at 846–47; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
7
Craig, 497 U.S. at 844; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (confrontation gives the accused the opportunity ‘‘of compelling [the witness] to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy
of belief’’).
8
Craig, 497 U.S. at 846; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
9
Supra note 6.
10

Supra note 6.
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as ‘essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.’’’11 It is not
only fairness to the accused that is at stake, but also the moral
responsibility of witnesses and of society at large, for ‘‘requiring
confrontation is a way of reminding ourselves that we are, or
at least want to see ourselves as, the kind of people who decline
to countenance or abet what we see as the cowardly and ignoble
practice of hidden accusation.’’12
● The Weight of History. The symbolic value of confrontation is
enhanced by the history of the right, which I will now review.13
Indeed, the very fact that for many centuries accused persons
have had the right to confront the witnesses against them makes
it especially important to continue to honor that right.
If an adjudicative system is rational, then it must rely in large
part on the testimony of witnesses and prescribe the conditions
under which they may testify. For many systems, one such condition
is that testimony must be given under oath. Another common condition, characteristic of the common law system but not limited to it,
is that testimony of a prosecution witness must be given in the
presence of the accused, subject to questioning by him or on his
behalf. The ancient Hebrews required confrontation,14 as did the
Romans. A Roman governor, Festus, pronounced: ‘‘It is not the
manner of the Romans to die before the accused has met his accusers
face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against
the charges.’’15
Once the irrational methods of medieval adjudication, such as
trial by ordeal and by battle, withered away, Western legal systems
developed different approaches to testimony. Continental systems
tended to take testimony on written questions—behind closed doors
and out of the presence of the parties—for fear that the witnesses

11
Craig, 497 U.S. at 847, quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017, quoting in part Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
12

See generally Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1258 (2003).
13
A more extensive historical discussion, with fuller citations, may be found in
Richard D. Friedman and Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1171, 1202–09 (2002).
14
Deut. 19:15–18.
15

Acts 25:16.
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would be coached or intimidated. By contrast, beginning in the
fifteenth century and continuing for centuries afterward, numerous
English judges and commentators—John Fortescue, Thomas Smith,
Matthew Hale, and William Blackstone among them—praised the
open and confrontational style of the English criminal trial. In a
celebrated sixteenth century description, for example, Smith spoke
approvingly of an ‘‘altercation’’ between accuser and accused.
Nearly two centuries later, Sollom Emlyn proclaimed, ‘‘In other
Countries, the Witnesses are examin’d in private, and in the Prisoner’s Absence; with us, they are produced face to face, and deliver
their Evidence in open Court, the Prisoner himself being present,
and at liberty to cross-examine them.’’ And later in the eighteenth
century Blackstone spoke of ‘‘the confronting of adverse witnesses’’
as being among the advantages of ‘‘the English way of giving testimony, ore tenus’’—that is, by word of mouth, or orally.16
To be sure, the norm of confrontation was not always respected.
First, a set of courts in England followed Continental procedures
rather than those of the common law. Precisely for that reason, they
were politically controversial. Most of them (notably the Court of
Star Chamber) were viewed as arms of an unlimited royal power
and did not survive the upheavals of the seventeenth century. Second, from the reign of Queen Mary, justices of the peace were
required by statutes to examine felony witnesses, and these examinations were admissible at trial, even though the witness had not been
cross-examined, if the examination was taken under oath and the
witness was then unavailable. This treatment—which almost certainly numbered among the chief abuses at which the Confrontation
Clause was aimed—was a continuing source of controversy, and in
1696, in the celebrated case of Rex v. Paine,17 the court refused to
extend it to misdemeanor cases; eventually, the practice was abolished by statutes for felony cases as well. Finally, and perhaps most
significant, the Crown, when trying to control its political adversaries
through treason prosecutions and other uses of the criminal law,
sometimes used testimony taken out of the presence of the accused.

16

For full citations, see Friedman & McCormack, supra note 13, at 1203–04.

17

87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696); 90 Eng. Rep. 527 (K.B. 1696); 90 Eng. Rep. 1062 (K.B.
1696); 91 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1696); 91 Eng. Rep. 1387 (K.B. 1696).
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The battle for confrontation was most clearly fought in the treason
cases of Tudor and Stuart England. Even early in the sixteenth century, treason defendants demanded that witnesses be brought before
them; often they used the term ‘‘face to face.’’ The notorious case
of Walter Raleigh was one of many in which Crown prosecutors
used confessions made by alleged accomplices of the accused, even
though the confessions were not made under oath or before the
accused. The self-accusing nature of such statements was said to be
an adequate substitute for the usual requirements of testimony. But
in 1662, the judges of the King’s Bench ruled unanimously and
definitively in Tong’s Case18 that a pretrial confession ‘‘cannot be
made use of as evidence against any others’’ than the confessor
himself.19
The confrontation right naturally found its way to America. There,
the right to counsel developed far more quickly than in England,
and with it an adversarial spirit that made confrontation especially
crucial. The right became a particular focus of American concerns
in the 1760s, when the Stamp Acts and other parliamentary regulations of the colonies provided for the examination of witnesses upon
interrogatories in certain circumstances. Not surprisingly, the early
state constitutions guaranteed the confrontation right. Some used
the time-honored ‘‘face to face’’ formula; as early as 1776, others,
following Hale and Blackstone, adopted language strikingly similar
to that later used in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.20
The Confrontation Clause states simply:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.21

Note that nothing in the history of the Clause, or in its text, suggests
that the confrontation right was considered contingent, inapplicable
upon a judicial determination that the particular testimony was
reliable. Rather, the Clause established as a categorical rule a basic
procedural norm that a witness may not be heard for the prosecution
unless the accused has an opportunity to be confronted by her—
18

Case of Thomas Tong, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061 (K.B. 1662).
Id. at 1062 (cited in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
20
Friedman & McCormack, supra note 13, at 1207–08.
19

21

U.S. Const. amend. VI, cl. 3.
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that is, the witness must speak in the presence of the accused, and
subject to cross-examination. Like Festus, we can say that it is not
our way to allow an accused to be convicted of a crime unless the
witnesses against him testify to his face.
III. Roberts and the Obscuring of the Confrontation Principle
I have presented a view of a relatively uncluttered confrontation
principle written into the Constitution by the Sixth Amendment.
But later the picture got badly muddied. Here is a brief speculative
account, which I have developed in greater detail elsewhere.22
A. The Rise of the Roberts Framework
The law against hearsay has not played a role in the historical
account underlying the Confrontation Clause, just as it does not
enter into the text of the Clause. Hearsay law, like evidence law
more generally, was not well developed at the time the constitutions
of the states of the United States, or the U.S. Constitution, articulated
the confrontation right, much less during previous centuries. In the
eighteenth century, the term hearsay closely conformed to the lay
sense of the word: Hearsay was what a witness contended she heard
another person say.
Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, the conception
of hearsay expanded.23 The reason for this expansion appears to have
been the growing role of criminal defense lawyers, who emphasized,
with respect to nontestimonial statements as well as testimonial
22

Friedman & McCormack, supra note 13, at 1209-27
See Thomas Peake, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence 10 (1801). Peake said,
in the course of his discussion of hearsay, that certain written memoranda made in
the ordinary course of business are admissible as ‘‘not within the exception as to
hearsay evidence.’’ He used ‘‘exception’’ in the same sense that today we would use
‘‘objection.’’ The statement, therefore, is that these memoranda are not excluded by
the hearsay rule; implicit may be the inchoate idea that other writings would be.
About a decade later, S.M. Phillipps made the principle clear: The exclusionary rule
‘‘is applicable to statements in writing, no less than to words spoken,’’ the only
difference being that there is greater facility of proof in the case of writings than of
oral statements. 1 S.M. Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 173 (1st Amer.
ed. from the 2d London ed. 1816). The point did not gain instant universality. Francis
Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 294b n. (Richard
Whalley Bridgman ed., 7th ed. 1817), follows Peake’s treatment, virtually to the point
of plagiarism. 3 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 447–48 (1827), treats
written evidence as distinct from hearsay, but claims that the same rules apply to both.
23
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ones, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination. This emphasis
led to sharper recognition that evidence is not ideal when the value
of the evidence depends on the credibility of a person not testifying
in court.24 This recognition in turn led to, or at least was associated
with, articulation of the modern definition of hearsay as an out-ofcourt statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts.25
As the law of hearsay expanded, exceptions to the hearsay rule
multiplied. Since the early nineteenth century, the trend has been
to expand those exceptions and to admit more statements into evidence. The articulated basis for the law largely has been shaped by
Wigmore’s emphasis on ‘‘trustworthiness,’’ but I suspect the actual
bounds of the hearsay doctrine were also shaped by an unarticulated
adherence to the confrontation principle. Inevitably, over time, the
confrontation principle was diluted and obscured: Treating nontestimonial statements on a par with testimonial ones meant that
an opportunity for cross-examination could not be regarded as an
absolute precondition for admission, but only as a desirable, and
sometimes dispensable, condition.26
So long as the Confrontation Clause was a limitation only on the
federal judicial system, its bounds, and its relationship to hearsay
doctrine, did not matter very much; pretty much any result the
Supreme Court would reach by applying the Confrontation Clause
it could also reach by applying nonconstitutional doctrine as well.27
24

In a contemplative discussion, Thomas Starkie noted that the exclusionary rule
does not apply ‘‘where declarations . . . possess an intrinsic credit beyond the mere
naked unauthorized assertions of a stranger.’’ 1 Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise
on the Law of Evidence 46 (1st American ed. 1826).
25
Note the following passage from 1 S.M. Phillipps, A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence 229 (7th ed. 1829), not found in earlier editions (including the 6th edition
of 1824): ‘‘Hearsay is not admitted in our courts of justice, as proof of the fact which
is stated by a third person.’’
26
Lost was the recognition of a critical difference between statements made ‘‘for
the express purpose of being given in evidence’’ and ‘‘the natural effusions of a party
. . . who speaks upon an occasion, when his mind stands in an even position, without
any temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth.’’ Phillipps, supra note 23, at 175,
quoting in part Eldon, L.C., in Whitlocke v. Baker, 13 Ves. Jr. 510, 514 (1807), and
citing Berkeley Peerage Case, 4 Camp. 402, 171 E.R. 128 (1811), in which some of the
judges drew the distinction.
27
Note, for example, the celebrated case of Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96,
98 (1933), in which the Court held the statement, ‘‘Dr. Shepard has poisoned me,’’
which it characterized as an ‘‘accusation,’’ inadmissible on hearsay grounds, without
mentioning the Confrontation Clause.
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But in 1965 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Confrontation Clause against the states.28 What the Clause
prevents then became critical. The trouble was that by this time the
Court had nearly lost sight of the purpose behind the Clause. And
so in Ohio v. Roberts,29 after fifteen years of deciding cases without
an overall theory of the Clause, the Court concocted a doctrine
that virtually conformed the meaning of the Clause to ordinary
hearsay law.
The essential elements of the Roberts doctrine were as follows:
First, Roberts held that any hearsay statement made by a person who
did not testify in court and offered against a criminal defendant
posed a confrontation issue. Second, hearsay could be admitted
without an opportunity for cross-examination if the statement satisfied certain conditions. The primary condition to be satisfied was
that the statement be ‘‘reliable.’’ A statement would be deemed
reliable if it either fit within a ‘‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’’ or
was supported by ‘‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’’
Third, in some set of circumstances, the scope of which was never
clear, another condition for admissibility was that the person had
to be unavailable at trial.30
All of these elements proved to be troublesome. First, the scope
of the Roberts doctrine was too broad. The Confrontation Clause
says nothing about hearsay, and many statements that fit within the
basic definition of hearsay—that is, out-of-court statements offered
to prove the truth of what they assert—do not plausibly threaten to
violate the right of a defendant ‘‘to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.’’
Second, reliability is a poor criterion, inappropriate for the Confrontation Clause. Trials are not supposed to be limited to reliable
evidence. Much of the evidence that is admitted—including, often,
testimony that has been subjected to cross-examination—is highly
unreliable. The function of the trial is to give the fact-finder an
opportunity to make its best assessment of the facts after considering
all the evidence properly presented, reliable and unreliable. Moreover, the hearsay exceptions do not all do a good job of sorting out
28
29
30

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
See id. at 65–66.
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reliable from unreliable evidence. A great deal of mundane hearsay
raises no strong grounds for doubt, and yet does not fit within an
exception. Conversely, much hearsay is plainly of dubious trustworthiness, even though it fits within a well-established exception. For
example, there is a long-standing exception for certain ‘‘dying declarations.’’ The traditional justification for this exception is that no
one about to meet her Maker would do so with a lie upon her lips.
In today’s world, this idea is nearly laughable—and it is not made
less so by the Supreme Court’s pious assertion in 1990 that the
rationale for the exception is so powerful that cross-examination
would be of ‘‘marginal utility.’’31
If a statement was not deemed to fit within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, it could yet satisfy the reliability requirement of Roberts
by meeting the ‘‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’’ test.
That test was notoriously amorphous and manipulable. The Court
tried to put some order on this case-by-case inquiry by insisting that
corroborating evidence could not satisfy it; only ‘‘circumstances . . .
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief’’ could be used.32 This limitation
perplexed the lower courts, which strained mightily against it.
Finally, the unavailability requirement proved equally difficult.
The Court never applied the requirement beyond the context in
which it was first articulated (i.e., where the statement at issue fit
within the hearsay exception for former testimony.) At times, it
appeared that this was the only context in which the Court would
apply the exception, at times it appeared that the Court might apply
the requirement to statements fitting within certain other exceptions,

31
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). Further, though a statement might
appear to fit within a firmly rooted exception, at least in the view of the forum state,
admission could yet be intolerable. Consider Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). There,
the statement at issue was a confession by one Thomas, according to which both he
and Lee played central roles in a gruesome double murder. Thomas was deemed
unavailable at Lee’s trial, by reason of privilege, and so the state offered the confession,
contending reasonably that it was a declaration against interest. The Court’s response,
that such a categorization defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation
Clause analysis, id. at 544 n.5, was buried in a footnote, perhaps because the Court
could not easily reconcile that response with its attempt in Roberts to make dispositive
the broad categorizations of hearsay law.
32
Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
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but the matter remained unresolved. Even knowledgeable observers
expressed confusion.
B. The Testimonial Framework
In the end, the Roberts framework—clunky, confusing, and manipulable—did not provide meaningful protection against the giving
of testimony behind closed doors. In recent years, there were glimmers of hope that the Court might change course. Concurring opinions by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in White v. Illinois,33
and by Justices Breyer and Scalia in Lilly v. Virginia,34 suggested the
possibility of a radical transformation. Finally, in Crawford, seven
justices converted the suggestion to reality, adopting a new organizing principle that treats the Confrontation Clause as a guarantee
that testimony offered against an accused must be given in the manner
prescribed for centuries, in the presence of the accused and subject
to cross-examination.
Recall that in Crawford the Washington Supreme Court held that
Sylvia Crawford’s statement, made in the station house to investigating officers, was admissible against Crawford, even though Sylvia
was considered unavailable to testify at trial, because the statement
was deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy Roberts. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed unanimously. The chief justice and Justice O’Connor
would simply have held that Sylvia’s statement did not satisfy Roberts. The other seven justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, agreed
that various factors—including the fact that Sylvia said her eyes
were closed during part of the incident!—pointed to the unreliability
of her statement. But this majority declined to rest the decision on
Roberts. Rather, the majority pointed to these factors, and the fact
that the Washington courts had concluded the statement was admissible, as a stark indication of the failure of Roberts. Accepting the
proposal made by Crawford, and supported by amici curiae (friendsof-the-court), the Court discarded the Roberts doctrine and adopted
instead a ‘‘testimonial’’ approach to the Confrontation Clause.
The essence of the testimonial approach may be grasped by considering Crawford’s treatment of the three elements of the Roberts doctrine outlined above.
33

502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).

34

527 U.S. 116, 141 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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First, Crawford makes clear that the principal—and perhaps only—
focus of the Confrontation Clause is testimonial statements. Justice
Scalia, for example, called ‘‘testimonial’’ statements the ‘‘principal
object’’ of the Sixth Amendment.35 This proposition is in accord with
the text of the Confrontation Clause; as noted above, the Clause
speaks of ‘‘witnesses,’’ the most natural meaning of which is those
who give testimony.36 The historical account given in Part II demonstrates that a focus on testimonial statements is also in accord with
the basic idea that motivated adoption of the Clause, one that is
still crucial to the Anglo-American system—that, in contrast to the
procedures of some systems of medieval Europe, witnesses against
an accused should give their testimony in the presence of the accused
and subject to oral cross-examination. Just what statements are to
be considered testimonial is an important question, one that is discussed below and that undoubtedly will be the subject of many
cases in coming years. The Court declined to furnish a comprehensive definition.
Second, the Court ruled that if a statement is ‘‘testimonial’’ and
is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts, that statement cannot
be admitted against an accused unless he has an opportunity to crossexamine the maker of the statement. As Justice Scalia emphasized,
‘‘Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.’’37 In other words,
reliability cannot substitute for cross-examination.
Third, in contrast to Roberts, under which unavailability had an
uncertain role that was difficult to defend,38 the Crawford Court
emphasized that the testimonial approach makes the role of unavailability quite clear and logical. As Justice Scalia explained, testimonial

35

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004).
The Latin for ‘‘witness’’ is ‘‘testis.’’ That word shares a root with ‘‘testimonium,’’
the core meaning of which is ‘‘the testimony of a witness.’’ And that, of course, is
the source of the English word ‘‘testimony.’’ The derivation appears to be through
the Old French; thus, in the modern French witness is ‘‘témoin’’ and testimony is
‘‘témoinage.’’ See, e.g., Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, 43(2)
Trans. Am. Phil. Soc. 335, 735 (1953); 17 Oxford English Dictionary 833 (2d ed. 1989).
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Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., id. at 1369.
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statements may be admitted ‘‘only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine.’’39 Ordinarily, the opportunity for cross-examination
should occur at trial. But if the witness—that is, the maker of the
testimonial statement—is unavailable to testify at trial, then crossexamination at an earlier proceeding will be acceptable as a secondbest substitute.
IV. Matters That Remain Unchanged
Crawford reflects a paradigm shift in the doctrine of the Confrontation Clause. Nonetheless, Crawford and amici went to some pains to
assure the Supreme Court that adoption of the testimonial approach
would alter the results in few, if any, of the Court’s own precedents.
A considerable number of decisions in the lower courts, however,
would come out differently under Crawford. To set the groundwork
for understanding how Crawford alters the doctrinal landscape and
the important issues that are likely to arise, it will first help to
examine several respects in which Crawford does not change the law.
First, under Crawford, as before, a statement does not raise a confrontation issue unless it is offered to prove the truth of a matter
that it asserts. This is the rule of Tennessee v. Street,40 which Crawford
explicitly reaffirms.41 In Street itself, for example, the defendant contended that the police coerced him to make a statement similar to
that of an accomplice’s confession. The Court ruled unanimously
that the prosecution therefore could introduce the accomplice’s confession to demonstrate not that it was true but that it was substantially different from the defendant’s. That result would be
unchanged under Crawford. There may be questions as to how far
a prosecutor may take this ‘‘not for the truth’’ argument. For example, if the prosecutor argues that the statement is being offered as
support for the opinion of an expert witness, in some cases that
might be considered too thin a veneer. Nonetheless, the basic doctrine remains in place.
Second, many statements that were admissible under Roberts will
still be admissible under Crawford, though the grounds of decision
39
40
41

Id.
471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.
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will be different. The question is not, as some analysts have posed
it, whether Crawford preserves given hearsay exceptions. The rule
against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are separate sources
of law—and Crawford stops the tendency to meld them. The question
for Confrontation Clause purposes in each case is whether the given
statement is testimonial. The fact that a statement fits within a hearsay exception does not alter its status with respect to that question.
But one can say that most statements that fit within certain hearsay
exceptions are not testimonial. For example, under Roberts, business
records and conspirator statements were deemed reliable because
they fell within ‘‘firmly rooted’’ hearsay exemptions. Under Crawford, almost all such statements will be considered non-testimonial,
and therefore the Confrontation Clause will impose little, if any,
obstacle to their admissibility.
Third, the rule of California v. Green42 also is preserved. As the
Crawford Court summarized the rule, ‘‘[W]hen the declarant appears
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.’’43
In my view, the rule is a dubious one. It fails to take into account
the serious impairment of the ability to cross-examine that arises
when a witness’s prior statement is admitted and the witness does
not re-assert its substance, effectively walking away from it.44 But
the Court has shown no inclination to modify the rule. Indeed, it
was reinforced by Justice Scalia himself in United States v. Owens,45
a case involving a witness whose severe head injuries destroyed
much of his memory—and it now becomes more important than
ever for prosecutors. If a witness makes a statement favorable to a
prosecutor, but the prosecutor is afraid that the witness will not
stand by the statement at trial, the prosecutor should not argue that
the statement is ‘‘reliable.’’ Rather, the prosecutor should bring the
witness to trial, or otherwise ensure that the defendant has had an
adequate opportunity for cross. If the witness reaffirms the substance
of the prior statement, all is well and good for the prosecutor. If
42
43

399 U.S. 149 (1970).
124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9.

44

See Richard D. Friedman, Prior Statements of a Witness: A Nettlesome Corner
of the Hearsay Thicket, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 277.
45
484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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she testifies at variance from the statement, then the Confrontation
Clause does not bar admissibility of the statement.
Fourth, in applying Roberts, the Court developed a body of case
law concerning what constitutes proof of unavailability (assuming
the given statement can be introduced only if the declarant is unavailable), and that case law—including part of Roberts itself—is left
untouched, for better or worse. At argument in Crawford, the chief
justice asked what impact the testimonial approach would have on
Mancusi v. Stubbs,46 a key case in this line and one in which he wrote
the majority opinion.47 The proper answer is simple: None at all.
Fifth, Crawford explicitly preserves the principle that the accused
should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right if the
accused’s own misconduct prevented him from having an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.48 The right may be forfeited, for example, if the accused murdered or intimidated the
witness. The forfeiture principle may take on greater importance
under Crawford, as explained below.
Sixth, the rule of Maryland v. Craig49 is unchanged, at least for
now. In that case, the Court held that, upon a particularized showing
that a child witness would be traumatized by testifying in the presence of the accused, the child may testify in another room, with the
judge and counsel present but the jury and the accused connected
electronically. Crawford addresses the question of when confrontation
is required; Craig addresses the question of what procedures confrontation requires. The two cases can coexist peacefully, and nothing
in Crawford suggests that Craig is placed in doubt. And yet, Justice
Scalia dissented bitterly in Craig. The categorical nature of his opinion in Crawford squares better with his Craig dissent than with Justice
O’Connor’s looser majority opinion in Craig, and presumably he
would welcome the opportunity to overrule Craig. Whether he
would have the votes is an open question.

46

408 U.S. 204 (1972).
Transcript of Oral Argument, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)
(No. 02-9410), available at 2003 WL 22705281.
48
124 S. Ct. at 1370.
47

49

497 U.S. 836 (1990).

454

The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed
Finally, Crawford leaves intact the final succor of prosecutors, the
rule that a violation of the confrontation right may be harmless and
therefore not require reversal.50
V. Changes and Open Questions
That Crawford leaves much of the status quo ante unchanged does
not gainsay that it changes a great deal, and not just the conceptual
framework of the Confrontation Clause. Here I will address respects
in which Crawford does change the law, questions that it leaves open,
and adjustments to existing law that might be adopted in its wake.
A. The Basic Change
Most fundamentally, of course, Crawford ends the prosecutorial
use of testimonial statements made to police in circumstances where
the accused cannot confront his accuser. That means that when a
prosecutor attempts to introduce a testimonial statement made by
a person who is not a witness at trial, the prosecutor will not be
able to argue that the statement should be admitted because it is
reliable. Unless the accused either has had the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant, or has forfeited the right to confront her, the
statement cannot be admitted.
Thus, to take an obvious example, some courts have been willing
to admit grand jury testimony given by a witness who is not available
at trial, persuading themselves that various factors—including the
fact that the testimony was given under oath—are in the aggregate
sufficiently strong ‘‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’’ to
excuse the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford
means that this practice must stop. Similarly, station-house statements, of the type involved in Crawford itself, and statements made
in plea hearings may not be introduced by the prosecution unless
either the witness testifies at trial or she is unavailable and the
accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her.
Courts have already begun to apply cases consistently with these
principles. In one Detroit murder case pending on appeal when
Crawford was decided, the prosecutor has since confessed error,
because the conviction depended in part on statements made to a
polygraph examiner by a friend of the accused. Consider also United
50

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). See also, e.g., Moody v. State, 594
S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2004).
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States v. Saner,51 a post-Crawford decision in which the accused, a
bookstore manager, objected to admission of a statement by a competitor, made to a Justice Department lawyer and paralegal, that the
two managers had fixed prices. The court held, properly, that
because the accused had not had a chance to cross-examine the
competitor, who asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial,
Crawford precluded admissibility of the competitor’s statement.52
B. The Meaning of ‘‘Testimonial’’
The most significant question that arises, of course, is how far the
category of ‘‘testimonial’’ statements extends.
1. Standards
The Crawford Court did not have difficulty in concluding that
Sylvia’s statement was testimonial: ‘‘Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations,’’ as Sylvia’s was, are ‘‘testimonial
under even a narrow standard.’’53 As the Court elaborated:
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are
the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.54

So much for the core. The boundaries of the category will have
to be marked out by future cases. The Court quoted three standards
without choosing among them:
● ‘‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially’’;
● ‘‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions’’; and
51
52

313 F. Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2004).
Id. at 902–03.

53

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
Id. The Court noted that ‘‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.’’ Id.
54
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● ‘‘statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’’55
I believe the third of these is the most useful and accurate. It captures
the animating idea behind the Confrontation Clause—the prevention of a system in which witnesses can offer their testimony in
private without cross-examination. In some cases, under this view,
a statement should be considered testimonial even though it was
not made to a government official.56
It is by no means certain that this standard will ultimately prevail.
Some language in Crawford emphasizes the role of government officers in creating testimony. For example, having used the term ‘‘interrogation,’’ the Court takes care to note that Sylvia’s statement,
‘‘knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition’’;57 at another point, it noted
that ‘‘[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of
testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for
prosecutorial abuse.’’58 This emphasis on government involvement
might suggest that the Court will stick closely to a minimalist definition of testimonial statements.
That would be a mistake, however. I do not believe that participation by government officials in creation of the statement—either
receipt of it as its initial audience or active procurement of it through
interrogation—is the essence of what makes a statement testimonial.
55

Id. (citations omitted).

56

Most obvious, a government investigator may use a private intermediary to
procure testimony, (but see People v. Geno, LC No. 01-046631-FC, 2004 WL 893947
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004)), or a witness might use an intermediary as her agent
for transmitting testimony to court. Thus, a declaration by a dying person identifying
her killer should be considered testimonial even though the only person who hears
it is a private individual; the purpose of the communication is presumably not merely
to edify the listener but to pass on to the authorities the victim’s identification of the
killer, and the understanding of both parties to the communication is that the listener
will play his role. Similarly, a complainant should not be able to avoid confrontation
by passing on her information to a private intermediary who effectively runs a
testimony-transmission operation—‘‘Make this videotape and I’ll pass it on to the
proper authorities. You don’t even have to take an oath, and after the tape is done
you can even leave the state if you want.’’
57
124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4.
58

Id. at 1367 n.7.
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The confrontation right was recognized in older systems in which
there was no public prosecutor, and victims or their families prosecuted crimes themselves. The idea behind the confrontation right is
that the judicial system cannot try an accused with the aid of testimony by a witness whom the accused has not had a chance to
confront. The prosecutor plays no essential role in the violation.
Thus, if just before trial a person shoved a written statement under
the courthouse door, asserting that the accused did in fact commit the
crime, that would plainly be testimonial even though no government
official played a role in preparing the statement.59 One ground for
hope in this respect is that Crawford itself noted that one of the
statements involved in the notorious Raleigh case was a letter.60
In some cases a problem that nearly is the reverse arises—an
investigative official may be seeking to procure evidence, but the
declarant may not understand this. I believe that in the usual case
the investigator’s anticipation should not alter characterization of
the statement. If the declarant does not recognize she is creating
evidence that may be used in a criminal proceeding, then the nature
of what she is doing in making the statement is not testimonial.
Thus, a conversation between criminal confederates, with no anticipation of a leak to the authorities, is not ordinarily testimonial, and
if in fact the authorities are surreptitiously recording the conversation, that should not change the result.61 On the other hand, investigators probably should not be allowed to disguise their intent gratuitously—that is, for the purpose of defeating the confrontation right.
Accordingly, even apart from a standard like the third one quoted
above, perhaps a statement should be considered testimonial in
what might be called an ‘‘invited statement’’ context in which the
statement fits a description such as this:

59
Indeed, the prosecutor cannot violate the confrontation right; there is nothing
wrong with a prosecutor interviewing a witness out of the presence of the accused,
and it is only when the court admits the witness’s statement into evidence that the right
is violated. It is thus the court’s conduct that is state action for constitutional purposes.
60
124 S. Ct. at 1360.
61
See People v. Torres, No. CRF01-84916, 2004 WL 575205 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24,
2004; as modified on denial of rehearing, Apr. 13, 2004) (unpublished op.).
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Before the statement is made, (1) a recipient of the statement
anticipates evidentiary use of the statement, but does not
inform the declarant of this anticipation, and (2) the prosecution does not demonstrate that disclosure of anticipation of
evidentiary use would have substantially diminished the
probability that the declarant would have made the
statement.

The idea behind the second prong of such a test would be that if
disclosing the recipient’s investigatory activity would not inhibit the
declarant from making the statement, then the disclosure probably
ought to be made; on the other hand, if the disclosure would likely
prevent the statement from being made, then the investigator has
sufficient reason for declining to make a disclosure. This rule seems
to me to have some merit, but it may be too complicated to be
applied satisfactorily.
2. Special Cases
Many cases will arise, in a wide variety of circumstances, in which
it is a close question whether a statement should be deemed testimonial. I will address here two of the most important recurring types
of cases.
a. When Are 911 Calls Testimonial?
Consider first the example of statements made in calls to 911
operators. In recent years, courts have often admitted these statements—most characteristically, by complainants in domestic violence cases—even though the caller has not testified in court. Under
Crawford, this practice would not be allowed if the statement is
deemed ‘‘testimonial.’’ The extent to which these calls are ‘‘testimonial,’’ however, is an open question.
The court in one post-Crawford case, in justifying its decision that
statements in 911 calls should not be deemed testimonial, declared:
Typically, a woman who calls 911 for help because she has
just been stabbed or shot is not contemplating being a ‘‘witness’’ in future legal proceedings; she is usually trying simply
to save her own life.62

62

People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
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This generalization fits some cases, but not all. In some cases, the
caller does not perceive that she is any longer in immediate danger,
and the primary purpose of the call is simply to initiate investigative
and prosecutorial machinery. Indeed, often the call occurs a considerable time after the particular episode has closed, and often the caller
gives a good deal of information that is not necessary for immediate
intervention. In a broader set of cases, the caller’s motives are mixed
but she is fully aware that what she says has potential evidentiary
value.
Consider, for example, State v. Davis,63 now on review in the Washington Supreme Court (the same court from which Crawford came).
The complainant called 911 and, in response to questions by the
operator, disclosed that the defendant had beaten her with his fists
and then run out the door, further disclosed that she had a protection
order against him, and explained the reasons why he had been in
her house. The complainant did not testify at trial, and the 911 tape
was played to the jury. In closing argument, the prosecutor said,
[A]lthough she is not here today to talk to you[,] she left
something better. She left you her testimony on the day that
this happened . . . . [T]his shows that the defendant, Adrian
Davis, was at her home and assaulted her.64

Then the prosecutor played the 911 tape again.65 Here, the statement
has strong claim to be considered testimonial.
Davis and cases like it suggest that the 911-call scenario should
not be dismissed by broad generalizations about the ‘‘typical’’ case.
Rather, a case-by-case assessment is necessary. Indeed, even if a 911
call is nothing but an urgent plea for protection, the court should
closely scrutinize it. I will repeat here the analysis that Bridget
McCormack and I have given:
To the extent the call itself is part of the incident being tried,
the fact of the call presumably should be admitted so the
prosecution can present a coherent story about the incident.
But even in that situation, the need to present a coherent
63

64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
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State v. Davis, Kings Cty. Super. Ct., King Co. No. 01102794-4 (KNT), Report of
Proceedings, May 5, 2001, at 55, conviction affirmed, 64 P.3d 661, review granted,
75 P.3d 969 (Wash. Sept. 5, 2003).
65
Id.
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story does not necessarily justify admitting the contents of
the call. And even if the circumstances do warrant allowing
the prosecution to prove the contents of the call, those contents generally should not be admitted to prove the truth of
what they assert . . . . To the extent that the contents of the
call are significant only as the caller’s report of what has
happened, such a report usually should be considered
testimonial.66

b. When Are Statements by Children ‘‘Testimonial’’?
Another type of case that frequently will test the limits of the term
‘‘testimonial’’ involves statements by children, typically alleging
some kind of abuse. Suppose, for example, a young child tells a
police officer that an adult has physically or sexually abused her. If
an adult made such a statement, it would clearly be testimonial. But
can a different result occur in the case of a very young child?
At some point, the statement of a very young child may perhaps
be considered more like the bark of a bloodhound than like the
testimony of an adult human; that is, the child may be reacting
to and communicating about what occurred, with no sense of the
consequences that her communication may have. Arguably, fidelity
to the text and policies of the Confrontation Clause suggests that
some degree of understanding of the consequences of the statement
is necessary before a declarant may be considered a ‘‘witness.’’ If
that is true, the better rule would probably be that a person is not
a witness unless she understands that the statement, if accepted, is
likely to lead to adverse consequences for the person accused. Under
this view, a child could be a witness even if she had no real understanding of the legal system; it would be enough to know that telling
a police officer about a bad thing that a person did would likely
cause that person to be punished.
In deciding whether a child is capable of acting as a ‘‘witness,’’
the moral as well as cognitive development of the child may well
be material. My colleague Sherman Clark has argued that part of
what drives the confrontation right is not simply the formal categorization of a person as a ‘‘witness,’’ but also the moral sense of the
obligation of an accuser to confront the accused.67 If he is right—
66

Friedman & McCormack, supra note 13, at 1243 (emphasis added).

67

Clark, supra note 12, at 1282.
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and I believe there is a good deal of force to the argument—then
the important question is not only whether the child understands
the punitive consequences of the statement, but also ‘‘the level of
obligation and responsibility we are willing to put on the shoulders
of children.’’68
Even assuming a given child is capable of making a testimonial
statement, the fact that the declarant is a child can complicate the
question of whether the particular statement should be deemed
testimonial. As I suggested earlier, when an adult makes a statement
accusing a person of a crime, the statement should be considered
testimonial, even though the statement is made to a private individual, if the declarant understands that the listener will pass the information on to the authorities. But consider children’s statements to
intermediaries—for instance, a child’s statement to his mother. This
situation may be materially different from that of the adult witness,
because even a child sufficiently mature to be capable of being
considered a witness may have no understanding that the third
party will pass the statement on to the authorities.
There are different ways to approach this problem. One view is
that the statement is not testimonial if a child in the position of the
declarant would not understand that the information would reach
the authorities. A second view is that if the child, without understanding the particulars, expects the mother to visit adverse consequences upon the assailant, then the child should be deemed to be
testifying within his or her ability to do so. And a third view is that
differentiating by maturity is simply inappropriate and unadministrable, so the perspective of a reasonable adult should govern determination of whether a statement is deemed testimonial.69
Furthermore, the supplemental standard I have suggested as a
possibility in ‘‘invited statement’’ contexts may be appropriate in
certain cases involving statements by children. Under that standard,
68

Id.
See People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396 (Cal. 2004) (applying to a fouryear-old child’s statement standard of reasonable expectation of an ‘‘objective
observer,’’ and rejecting the view that this should be applied by considering ‘‘an
objective witness in the same category of persons as the actual witness"); State v.
Courtney, Nos. A03-790, A03-791, 2004 WL 1488539 (Minn. Ct. App. July 6, 2004)
(six-year-old child’s interview with child protective services worker is testimonial;
no suggestion that declarant’s age is relevant).
69
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the statement should be deemed testimonial (1) if the investigative
nature of the conversation is withheld from the child but (2) it does
not appear that the nondisclosure was necessary to procure the
statement. Again, the idea is that the investigator should not be
allowed to withhold the purposes of her inquiries gratuitously in
an effort to defeat the confrontation right—but the complexity of
this inquiry gives me some qualms whether this standard should
be applied.
Plainly, this is an extraordinarily complex and difficult area, and
pending further guidance from the Court it will remain very
uncertain.70
3. What Constitutes an ‘‘Opportunity for Cross-Examination’’?
Under Crawford, the confrontation right presumptively is violated
if a statement is considered ‘‘testimonial’’ but the witness does not
testify at trial. By contrast, the confrontation right is not violated
where the witness is unavailable and the accused has had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. In the wake of Crawford, a wise
prosecutor, aware of the possibility that a key witness may be
unavailable, will often take the witness’s deposition early in the
investigation. Crawford therefore raises an important question about
what constitutes an adequate ‘‘prior opportunity for crossexamination.’’
For example, suppose a laboratory report is a critical piece of
evidence. In most circumstances, the lab report should be considered
testimonial, because the report is prepared in anticipation of its
introduction at trial. Therefore, the lab technician who made the
report should testify at trial if she is available to do so. If she becomes
unavailable through no fault of the accused (by accidental death,
for example), and the accused has not had an opportunity to crossexamine her, then the report should not be considered admissible.
But if the prosecution takes her deposition—that is, a pretrial examination, subject to oath and cross-examination—and the technician
later becomes unavailable, the prosecutor may use the deposition if
the deposition presented an adequate opportunity for crossexamination.

70

Compare, e.g., People v. Geno, LC No. 01-046631-FC, 2004 WL 893947 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 27, 2004), with Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
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Because Crawford increases the prosecutor’s incentive to take a
deposition, we can expect pressure to amend the rules of criminal
procedure in jurisdictions, including at the federal level, in which
depositions are not now readily available, and perhaps even to allow
depositions before charges have been brought. If a deposition is
taken very early, obviously there will often be a question whether
it gave the accused an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. Did
counsel have enough time to prepare? Did counsel know what issues
to press, and have the information at hand that would enable her
to do so effectively? The better approach would not be to assume
that early opportunities are inadequate per se; in many cases, counsel
will have little difficulty, even with limited preparation and even
before matters have proceeded very far, determining what questions
to ask. Rather, if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness at deposition but the witness is unavailable at trial, the
confrontation right should not require exclusion unless the defense
shows some particular reason to believe the opportunity was
inadequate.
One more change in prosecutorial practice may well follow from
Crawford. Suppose a prosecutor announces an intention to use a
witness’s statement and invites the defense to demand a deposition
of the witness if it wants to be assured of cross-examining the witness. If the defendant does not make the demand, the witness is
unavailable at trial, and the prosecution offers the statement, would
this procedure suffice to protect adequately the ‘‘opportunity for
confrontation’’? Perhaps, by not making the demand though being
warned of the possible consequences, the defendant would be
deemed to have waived the confrontation right. Or perhaps the
procedure would be considered a violation of the accused’s passive
right to do nothing and ‘‘be confronted with’’ the witnesses against
him. We may never know for sure unless the procedure is tried.
4. What Constitutes ‘‘Forfeiture’’?
The idea that the accused cannot claim the confrontation right if
the accused’s own misconduct prevents the witness from testifying
at trial is a very old one. Crawford explicitly reaffirms it,71 and justifiably so.
71

Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004).
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Forfeiture often raises difficult issues. If a witness is murdered
shortly before she was scheduled to testify against the accused, what
showing of the accused’s involvement does the prosecution have to
make? Is it enough that the accused acquiesced in the wrongdoing?
And how is participation or acquiescence to be determined; is the
mere fact that the accused benefited from the murder enough to
raise a presumption that the accused acquiesced in it?
One issue on which Crawford gives little or no guidance may be
expected to become particularly pressing now. Suppose the wrongful act that allegedly rendered the witness unavailable is the same
act with which he is charged. May the act nevertheless cause a
forfeiture of the confrontation right? For example, suppose the accusation is of child sexual abuse and the prosecution argues that the
abuse itself has intimidated the child from testifying in court (though
she previously made a statement describing it). Or suppose the
accusation is of murder, the prosecution contending that the accused
struck a fatal blow and that the victim made a statement identifying
the accused and then died?
The first reaction of many observers is that in such situations
forfeiture would be bizarre. And yet, for reasons I will summarize
briefly, I believe that in some circumstances it is appropriate.72 In
post-Crawford cases, two state supreme courts have agreed.73
The objection most frequently made to applying forfeiture doctrine
in situations of this sort is that it is bootstrapping: The accused is
held to have forfeited the confrontation right on the ground that he
or she committed the very act on which the trial centers—an act
that he or she is accused of committing, but denies committing and
is presumed not to have committed. On closer analysis, I do not
believe the objection carries weight. The situation is analogous to
the one that often arises when a defendant is accused of conspiracy
and the prosecution argues that the hearsay rule poses no bar to
admission of a statement made by a conspirator in support of the
conspiracy. In each of these cases, the same factual issue—the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy in the one case, and his commission of the wrongful act that rendered the witness unavailable
72
See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 Isr.
L. Rev. 506 (1997).
73
People v. Moore, No. 01CA1760, 2004 WL 1690247 (Col. July 29, 2004); State v.
Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004).
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in the other—may arise as a threshold matter for evidentiary purposes and when determining guilt, but so what? The issue will likely
be decided for the two different purposes by different fact-finders—
the judge deciding threshold evidentiary matters and the jury determining guilt—and on different factual bases.74
Another objection is that presumably the crime was not committed
for the purpose of rendering the witness unavailable. But again I
respond with a shrug. The point of forfeiture doctrine is that the
accused has acted wrongfully in a way that is incompatible with
maintenance of the right. Suppose that an informer makes a statement to the police describing a drug kingpin’s illegal activities.
But the informer stays undercover and, before the kingpin knows
anything about the statement, the two get into a fight over a card
game. The kingpin goes to a closet, pulls out a gun, and murders the
informer. If the kingpin is tried on drug charges and the prosecution
wants to introduce the informer’s statement, the kingpin should not
succeed in arguing, ‘‘But I haven’t had a chance to cross-examine
him.’’ The appropriate response is, ‘‘And whose fault is that? You
murdered him.’’
As interpreted in this way, forfeiture doctrine can solve one of
the puzzles of the confrontation right. The Crawford Court accurately
noted that the ‘‘dying declaration’’ exception is the only exception
commonly applicable to testimonial statements that had been wellestablished at the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption in 1791.75
The Court then said, with apparently studied ambiguity, ‘‘If this
exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.’’76
It seems highly unlikely that the Court would generally exclude
statements that fit within the dying declaration exception, thus
achieving a remarkably unappealing evidentiary result that courts
have avoided for several hundred years.
On the other hand, admitting these statements on the ground
suggested by the Court raises problems of its own. It obscures the
clarity of the principle adopted by Crawford, that if a statement is
testimonial it cannot be introduced against the accused unless he
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. And it does so on
74
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very weak grounds, for (as noted above) the rationale generally cited
for the dying declaration exception is absurd. A far better resolution
would be to recognize that, however the admissibility of dying
declarations usually has been defended, it really is best understood
as a reflection of the principle that a defendant who renders a witness
unavailable by wrongful means cannot complain about her absence
at trial. That principle also explains, incidentally, why (1) the hearsay
exception for dying declarations is limited to those that describe the
cause of death, and (2) the declaration will not be admitted unless
death appeared imminent at the time the declaration was made.
C. Crawford’s Impact on Non-Testimonial Statements
If a statement is deemed not to be testimonial, what is the impact
of the Confrontation Clause? Crawford does not resolve the matter.
The theory of the opinion suggests, and the Court explicitly preserves
the possibility of, ‘‘an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.’’77 But, in an apparent
compromise, the Court also indicated that Roberts, or some standard
even more flexible, might also be applied in this context.78
Numerous post-Crawford courts, having determined the statements at issue were not testimonial, have gone through the Roberts
analysis and—not surprisingly—determined that the statements were
admissible.79 It is easy enough to see why a court disposed to admit
a statement would follow this approach: If instead the court held
that the Confrontation Clause did not apply at all to non-testimonial
statements, it might leave itself vulnerable to reversal if a higher
court held that Roberts continues to apply to such a statement. So it
is prudent to run through the Roberts analysis, which a court can
always find is satisfied if it wants to (that being one of the problems
with Roberts.) No terrible harm is done, perhaps, but the process
is wasteful, because courts will continue to run through it with
predictable results.80 Until a prosecutor is brave enough to press the
77
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point, it is doubtful that there will be a clear test in the Supreme
Court on the proposition that outside the context of testimonial
statements, the Confrontation Clause has no force.
VI. Conclusion
Plainly, Crawford leaves open many very important questions. In
particular, the impact of the opinion may be very different depending on whether the Supreme Court adopts a broad or narrow understanding of the term ‘‘testimonial.’’ But what is most important is
that the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause, after a long
detour, has been set on the proper course. This means that the
discourse can be rational and candid. Rather than manipulating
unanswerable questions as to whether a given statement is sufficiently ‘‘reliable’’ to warrant admission, the courts will be asking
whether admission violates the time-honored and constitutionally
protected right of a criminal defendant to insist witnesses against
him testify subject to cross-examination.
Even in the pages of this journal, I am willing to confess that I
am not a strict originalist in constitutional interpretation. I believe
that there are some questions of constitutional law that cannot be
answered most usefully by asking what the public meaning was of
the constitutional text at the time it was adopted, or what the intention of the Framers was. But in this context, all indications are in
alignment. The historical background shows that the meaning of
the text and the intention of the Framers are quite clear, and the
unequivocal procedural rule on which they insisted continues to
resonate today as one of the central aspects of our system of criminal
procedure. The Crawford Court properly said, ‘‘By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we
do violence to their design.’’81 The Constitution does not always
speak in terms of categorical guarantees, but when it does, as in the
case of the Confrontation Clause, it should be heeded. Give credit
to the Court for disenthralling itself from a doctrine that had grown
familiar but had no basis in the Constitution and was utterly unsatisfactory, and for recognizing the essence of the confrontation right.
a court has decided that a statement was (1) not excluded by the hearsay rule,
(2) not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, and yet (3) rendered
inadmissible by Roberts.
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